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Introduction
Following the worst recession to hit the global economy 
in more than sixty years, the recovery which had begun 
in mid 2009 continued during the rest of the year and in 
early 2010. Overall, the revival in activity has so far been 
slightly stronger than expected six months ago, the reso-
lute action of the monetary authorities and governments 
at the height of the crisis having proved effective in restor-
ing the operation of the financial system and providing 
support for demand, thereby reviving business and con-
sumer confidence across the world. Thus, after reaching 
a low point in the second quarter of 2009, international 
trade began expanding again, while the substantial de-
stocking eased and the financial market tensions faded 
away in most economic regions.
However, the recovery varied in strength from one country 
to another : in that regard, the emerging economies of 
Asia, propelled mainly by China, acted as a driving force. 
In view of the scale of the financial crisis and the economic 
recession, a number of factors could hamper this recovery 
in the advanced economies, after the initial upturn. On 
the  one  hand,  the  sizeable  fiscal  and  monetary  stimuli 
will need to be phased out, giving way to consolidation. 
Also, restoration of a sound financial position on the part 
of the various economic agents, though necessary to lay 
the foundations for balanced, sustainable growth, could 
depress demand for some time. However, the scale of that 
adjustment varies from one sector to another – govern-
ment, financial institutions, non-financial corporations or 
households – in the different countries.
In the euro area as a whole, and the European Union in 
general, growth has also returned to positive figures since 
mid 2009, but it is less vigorous than in the United States, 
and especially, the emerging economies. The economic 
recession has highlighted major internal or external imbal-
ances in some economies, while the growth of public defi-
cits and debts has fuelled fears on the financial markets 
concerning the long-term sustainability of public finances ; 
in Greece’s case it triggered liquidity problems. On that 
occasion, as had also happened at the time of the autumn 
2008 banking crisis, the various institutions involved – IMF, 
EC, ECB – and the European governments took measures 
during May 2010 to ensure that the tensions on certain 
segments of the government bond market did not spread 
to the financial sector as a whole. However, those plans 
will need to be accompanied by drastic fiscal retrench-
ment and measures to strengthen the competitiveness of 
the economies concerned.
The  macroeconomic  projections  for  2010-2011  from 
the Eurosystem’s six-monthly exercise for the euro area, 
presented in the June 2010 ECB Bulletin  (1), and the cor-
responding projections for Belgium were therefore pro-
duced in a context which is both encouraging and highly 
uncertain. For the euro area, compared to the December 
2009 findings, the new projections record growth which 
has undergone slight upward revision in 2010, as a result 
of foreign demand. However, domestic demand remains 
sluggish, and that explains why the growth rate predicted 
for 2011 is still low. In the short term, inflation is driven 
higher  by  the  combined  effects  of  the  recent  increase 
in  commodity  prices  and  the  depreciation  of  the  euro. 
Yet  domestic  price  pressure  remains  weak  and  should 
  continue to be subdued during the projection period.
(1)  The Eurosystem’s macroeconomic projections for the euro area, published in June 
and December each year, are updated by the ECB in March and September.8
In Belgium the picture is broadly the same, although – in 
the  absence  of  major  imbalances  –  the  economy  has 
proved relatively resilient during the recession and should 
enjoy growth slightly above the euro area average in 2010 
and 2011. This article explains those findings in detail. 
The first section summarises recent developments and the 
outlook for the international environment, together with 
the Eurosystem central bank projections for the euro area. 
A box sets out the technical assumptions underlying this 
joint exercise. Section 2 gives the detailed results for activ-
ity and employment in Belgium, section 3 examines the 
components of demand, while section 4 deals with infla-
tion and labour costs. Section 5 focuses on the general 
government accounts. In that regard, it should be noted 
that  the  projections  for  public  finances  take  account 
only of measures which have been formally approved by 
the government, with sufficiently specific implementing 
conditions. The final section looks at the risks surround-
ing these projections, and compares them with the other 
main forecasts available for Belgium.
The Bank’s projections were finalised on the basis of data 
available as at 27 May 2010.
1.  International environment
1.1  The global economy
The revival in activity and international trade which began 
in mid 2009, encouraged by accommodating economic 
policies,  the  easing  of  financial  market  tensions,  and 
the  restoration  of  business  and  consumer  confidence, 
continued  and  even  gathered  momentum  during  the 
second half of 2009 and at the start of 2010. However, 
the strength of the recovery varied from one economic 
region to another. The emerging Asian countries main-
tained steady growth, making a major contribution to the 
recovery of world trade, and taking in tow the economies 
with which they have close links, including the commod-
ity exporting countries. In China, in the first quarter of 
2010, GDP growth reached 11.9 p.c. compared to the 
corresponding quarter of the previous year.
Growth  was  weaker  in  the  advanced  economies,  with 
GDP up by 2.5 p.c. in the United States, 4.2 p.c. in Japan 
and 0.5 p.c. in the European Union as a whole, so that 
neither output nor exports there have yet regained their 
pre-crisis level. In that context, central banks kept their 
key interest rates at historically low levels, after the large 
and  rapid  cuts  adopted  during  the  recession  became 
widespread, and have so far only just started to dismantle 
the exceptional measures which they had taken to avert 
the risks of the collapse of the financial system in late 
2008  and  early  2009.  Similarly,  the  support  measures 
taken by the governments have generally been kept on, 
although their impact on activity is now less than it was 
at first.
The strengthening of the global economy and the easing 
of financial market tensions triggered a marked recovery 
in business confidence throughout 2009 and 2010, with 
the  survey  indicators  returning  to  levels  comparable  to 
their historical average. That improvement in turn pres-
ages a continuing revival in economic activity, since firms 
could  become  less  restrictive  in  their  attitude  towards 
stock-building, employment or investment.
At the same time, the more sustained demand, particu-
larly from the emerging economies, has brought a reversal 
in the trend in commodity prices. After reaching a low 
point in December 2008 at around USD 40 per barrel of 
Brent, crude oil prices on the international markets dou-
bled to an average of USD 80 in May 2010, exerting direct 
upward pressure on inflation.
However,  there  are  various  factors  suggesting  that  the 
strengthening  of  activity  could  be  relatively  modest  in 
the advanced economies, as is generally the case after 
economic  recessions  accompanied  by  a  financial  crisis. 
First, the effect of temporary factors which had permitted 
the recovery – notably the measures encouraging the pur-
chase of new vehicles in certain countries, the accelera-
tion of public investment, and the turnaround in the trend 
in stocks – is likely to wane. The other components of 
domestic demand could take some time to gain momen-
tum, since at this stage the effects of the economic and 
financial crisis have not yet been fully absorbed. Not only 
did the crisis give rise to excess capacity – concerning both 
physical capacity and labour – but it also led to a deterio-
ration in the balance sheet position of credit institutions, 
firms and households, exacerbated in some countries by 
a major property market correction. Restoration of that 
position by a process of reducing debt levels or increasing 
savings is likely to depress demand. Finally, the recession 
resulted in a sharp deterioration in public finances world-
wide,  threatening  their  long-term  sustainability  unless 
consolidation measures are taken.
These  factors  seem  particularly  significant  for  the  euro 
area countries, as is evident from the financial markets’ 
increasing attention to the situation in certain countries, 
reflected in a marked widening of the spreads on gov-
ernment bonds in relation to German Bunds. In general, 
recent developments have highlighted external imbalances 
(in terms of competitiveness) and internal imbalances (via 
an excessive increase in debt levels) within the euro area. 9
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chart  1  dEvElopmEnts concErning thE financial markEts, BusinEss confidEncE and intErnational tradE
(monthly data, unless otherwise stated)
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Sources : BIS, CPB, HWWI, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
(1)  Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Broad index.
(2)  Wilshire 5000 index.
(3)  Topix index.
(4)  MSCI Emerging Markets index.10
The box below discusses the tensions and their conse-
quences for the euro area. Those fears have also sparked 
the depreciation of the euro by causing a downward revi-
sion of the growth forecasts : the exchange rate dropped 
from USD 1.44 at the end of 2009 to USD 1.26 per euro, 
on average, in the last 10 days of May 2010, a 13 p.c. 
depreciation. At the same time, European stock market 
indices fell by around 10 p.c. against their 2010 peak, 
driven down by financial stocks.
Against  this  backdrop  of  a  recovery  in  global  activity 
accompanied by great uncertainty in the advanced econo-
mies, the forecasts for the main economic regions indicate 
continuing  growth  in  2010  and  2011,  following  the 
0.9 p.c. fall in world GDP in 2009. That year saw the first 
global recession since the Second World War. However, 
some countries such as China and India had been spared, 
and maintained clearly positive growth. According to the 
EC forecasts, the emerging Asian countries and commod-
ity exporting countries such as Brazil and Russia should 
see vigorous growth again in 2010 and 2011, close to the 
pre-crisis average.
GDP growth is likely to be less robust in the advanced 
economies,  being  estimated  at  2.8  p.c.  in  the  United 
States, 2.1 p.c. in Japan, and 1 p.c. on average in the EU. 
In these first two cases, the growth rate is expected to 
fall slightly in 2011, as the temporary effect of the initial 
bounce  will  only  gradually  be  replaced  by  the  endog-
enous  strengthening  of  demand  for  consumption  and 
investment. In the EU, the expansion of activity is set to 
continue strengthening in 2011, though it will only reach 
1.7 p.c. However, these figures are insufficient to reduce 
the unemployment rate.
Box 1  –    Tensions on the government bond markets and their consequences 
for the euro area
The private debt crisis which had begun on the US property market and affected the financial sector in many 
countries by August 2007, and even more seriously from September 2008 onwards, causing the severest global 
recession for sixty years, ultimately led to a public debt crisis in certain European countries. In October 2009, the 
revelation of a large upward revision in Greece’s public deficit generated tensions on the Greek public debt market. 
In April 2010, concerns about the sustainability of Greek public finances worsened, generating a steep rise in the 
interest rates at which the Greek State was able to raise finance, and thus triggering a liquidity crisis. Moreover, 
contagion effects began to appear. Financial operators focused their attention on the situation in countries facing 
similar – though much less acute – problems concerning public finances and competitiveness, such as Portugal 
and Spain. In addition, fears that the insolvency of Greece, and perhaps other countries, too, might cause losses 


















World   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.9 4.0 4.0
of which :
United States  . . . . . . . . . . –2.4 2.8 2.5
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –5.2 2.1 1.5
European Union  . . . . . . . . –4.2 1.0 1.7
China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 10.3 9.4
India  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 8.1 8.0
Russia   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –7.9 3.7 4.0
Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 5.7 4.5
p.m.	World	imports	 . . . . . . . . .   –11.1   7.7   6.0
  inflation	 (1)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.4 1.7 0.3
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.4 –0.5 –0.4
European Union  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.8 1.7
  Unemployment	 (2)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 9.7 9.8
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 5.3 5.3
European Union  . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 9.8 9.7
Source : EC (Spring forecasts, May 2010).
(1)  Consumer price index.
(2)  Percentages of the labour force.
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the potential impact of that turbulence on the financing of the economy caused a decline in share prices and a 
rise in the risk premium component of corporate bonds, as well as a depreciation of the euro.
The authorities took various measures to contain the crisis and safeguard financial stability in the euro area. That 
involved providing financial assistance for the States facing a self-fulfilling loss of confidence on the financial 
markets, to give them time to regain their credibility, as well as restoring the operation of the disrupted markets, 
and giving an assurance of radical measures to consolidate the public finances of the countries in difficulty.
On the one hand, the European budgetary authorities and the IMF set up a system of conditional financial 
assistance. On 2 May 2010, the Eurogroup decided to grant this type of support to Greece : under a three-year 
programme, Greece will be able to borrow 110 billion euro, namely 30 billion from the IMF and 80 billion from 
the other euro area Member States ; those loans are conditional on the application of stringent fiscal retrenchment 
measures (an improvement in the structural balance of at least 10 p.c. of GDP between 2009 and 2014, much 
of it during 2010, and a reform of the pension system). The agreement also provides for the implementation of 
structural reforms to strengthen the Greek economy, notably by improving the operation of the labour market. 
Since this decision brought only very brief respite on the financial markets, the Ecofin Council decided on 9 and 
10 May 2010 to create a European stabilisation mechanism for a three-year period, for the purpose of granting 
conditional financial aid to countries getting into difficulty on account of exceptional events beyond their control, 
up to a total of 500 billion euro. European Commission loans could fund a total of 60 billion euro intended for 
all EU Member States. In addition, a Special Purpose Vehicle guaranteed by the euro area Member States could 
contribute up to 440 billion euro towards financing assistance for euro area countries. The IMF is to participate 
in the support operations and the definition of the conditions ; it is expected to provide assistance equivalent 
to at least half of the European aid. At the same meeting, the Council also gave a firm undertaking to speed 
up fiscal consolidation and structural reforms where necessary. In that connection, the Spanish and Portuguese 
governments announced new fiscal measures.
In  addition,  on  10  May  2010,  the  ECB  Governing  Council  –  after  having  adapted  the  rules  on  guarantees 
accompanying Eurosystem loans – adopted a series of measures designed to ease the serious tensions on certain 
markets. In particular, it decided to intervene on the public and private bond markets of the euro area in order to 
remedy the disruption on the securities markets (Securities Markets Programme), and to neutralise the impact of 
those operations on liquidity. It also reactivated the supply of unlimited three- and six-month liquidity at a fixed 
rate, and the provision of liquidity in US dollar. Monetary policy will continue to aim at price stability in the euro 
area : decisions on the monetary policy stance will depend on an assessment of the risks of inflation – in particular, 
it is important to ensure that a false perception of a monetary financing of the public sector does not fuel inflation 
expectations – and the risks of deflation – the effect of fiscal adjustments on demand and hence on prices being 
duly taken into account.
It is vital to learn lessons from the crisis in order to improve the governance of the euro area. The strengthening 
of national fiscal institutions is likewise crucial. On 12 May 2010, the European Commission published a series of 
proposals for strengthening the coordination of economic policies, centring on four topics : an improvement in the 
application of the Stability and Growth Pact (with greater emphasis on the long-term sustainability of public finances, 
sanctions in the event of insufficient progress towards the medium-term objectives, and heavier penalties under the 
excessive deficit procedure) ; the supervision of macroeconomic developments in the euro area countries (including 
the possibility of issuing recommendations in the event of imbalances, loss of competitiveness, or excessive increases 
in credit and asset prices) ; introduction of a “European semester” permitting coordination of fiscal and structural 
supervision and their integration in the national parliamentary processes ; and consolidation of the crisis management 
system for the euro area shaped by the European stabilisation mechanism, comprising assistance to safeguard 
financial stability and strict conditions to avoid moral hazard, i.e. implicit encouragement for fiscal laxity. Since then, 
a working group on economic governance set up by the president of the European Council has started work. It is to 
report to the European Council on 17 June and plans to present its conclusions in October 2010.12
Table  2	 EurosystEm	projEctions


















Inflation (HICP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3   1.4 /  1.6   1.0 / 2.2 0.0 2.0 1.9
GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –4.1   0.7 /  1.3   0.2 / 2.2 –3.0 1.3 1.7
of which :
Private consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.2   –0.2 /  0.4   –0.2 / 1.6 –1.7 0.6 1.2
Public consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6   0.3 /  1.3   –0.3 / 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.3
Investment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –10.8   –3.4 / –1.2   –2.1 / 2.7 –4.2 –1.4 1.5
Exports   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –13.2   5.5 /  9.1   1.1 / 7.9 –12.6 6.4 4.3
Imports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –12.0   3.8 /  7.0   0.4 / 6.8 –12.8 5.2 4.1
Sources : ECB, NBB.
 
1.2  Eurosystem projections for the euro area
Boosted by the strengthening export markets, the support 
measures adopted under the government recovery plans 
to combat the recession, and the easing of the strong 
tendency  towards  de-stocking  recorded  a  year  earlier, 
activity  in  the  euro  area  began  expanding  again  from 
the third quarter of 2009. However, growth was modest, 
at 0.7 p.c. in cumulative terms up to the first quarter of 
2010, following a maximum fall of 5.2 p.c. during the 
recession.
According  to  the  Eurosystem  projections,  the  recovery 
should continue at a modest pace in 2010, the support 
provided by foreign demand being partly offset by the 
gradual  disappearance  of  the  temporary  effects  associ-
ated with economic policy measures or stock movements. 
The recovery should strengthen gradually during 2011, as 
domestic demand picks up. In all, after a fall of 4.1 p.c. in 
2009, GDP is projected to grow in real terms by between 
0.7 and 1.3 p.c. in 2010 and between 0.2 and 2.2 p.c. in 
2011. As is generally the case after a financial crisis, the 
recovery rate will therefore be modest, taking account of 
the necessary adjustments to the balance sheet position 
of  financial  institutions,  non-financial  corporations  and 
households, while substantial surplus production capacity 
still persists as yet.
Turning  to  the  components  of  demand,  exports  could 
be underpinned by strong foreign market growth, while 
benefiting from the favourable impact on competitiveness 
of the euro’s depreciation. Taking account of the excess 
capacity and the still high level of uncertainty over the 
outlook for demand, business investment will be slow to 
respond to the revival in activity. Moreover, although the 
property market corrections taking place in certain euro 
area countries have become less severe in recent months, 
they  will  continue  to  depress  investment  in  housing. 
Finally, the growth of consumption will initially be curbed 
by disposable income, affected by wage moderation and 
the weakness of employment. Unemployment is in fact 
likely  to  continue  rising  during  the  projection  period, 
now that the initial shock resulting from the decline in 
output  in  late  2008  and  early  2009  has  been  largely 
absorbed by the simultaneous reduction in working time 
per  person  and  productivity.  These  factors  restraining 
domestic demand should gradually ease, as the improve-
ment in the economic situation continues. However, the 
savings rate is likely to remain significantly above its pre-
crisis level, owing to higher unemployment and the great 
uncertainty over the economic and financial prospects.
Inflation  has  gathered  pace  considerably  in  the  recent 
period, from an average of 0.3 p.c. in 2009 to 1.5 p.c. 
in  April  2010,  owing  to  the  impact  of  energy  prices. 
That  movement,  due  to  the  disappearance  of  base 
effects resulting from the sharp fall in oil prices a year 
ago, followed by their renewed rise and the recent euro 
depreciation, is expected to continue during the year. As 
demand is still relatively feeble, however, domestic infla-
tionary pressures should be contained in regard to both 
unit labour costs and profit margins. Overall, inflation is 
expected to average between 1.4 and 1.6 p.c. in 2010 
and between 1 and 2.2 p.c. in 2011.13
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Box 2  –  Assumptions adopted for the projections
Produced as part of a joint exercise, the economic projections for the euro area, and the Bank’s projections for 
Belgium, are based on a set of technical assumptions drawn up jointly by the ECB and the national central banks 
of the Eurosystem. The main ones are summarised here :
–    The interest rate assumptions are based on market expectations. As an annual average, rates on three-month 
interbank deposits are expected to fall from 1.2 p.c. in 2009 to 0.8 p.c. in 2010, before picking up to 1.1 p.c. 
in 2011. The yield on ten-year Belgian government bonds is projected at 3.5 p.c. in 2010 and 3.9 p.c. in 2011.
–    Bilateral exchange rates are held constant at their value in the second half of May 2010, namely USD 1.26 to 
the euro.
–    In line with the implicit prices reflected in forward contracts, the price of a barrel of Brent is expected to average 
USD 79.5 in 2010 and USD 83.7 in 2011, compared to USD 61.9 in 2009.
–    Following the slump at the end of 2008 and in early 2009, world trade began growing again last year. That 
expansion is set to continue in 2010 and 2011. As an annual average, demand from Belgium’s export markets, 
calculated on the basis of the movement in the imports of the various trading partners, declined by 10.8 p.c. in 
2009. The volume of demand is projected to grow by 7 p.c. in 2010 and 4.2 p.c. in 2011.
Regarding public finances, the projections are based – in accordance with the Eurosystem conventions – on the 
macroeconomic environment and policy measures that have already been announced and specified in sufficient 
detail by governments, and which have been or are likely to be approved by national parliaments.
4






























































































CRUDE OIL PRICE (1)
(monthly averages per barrel of Brent)
In euro Rate on three-month interbank deposits in euro
INTEREST RATE (2)
(quarterly averages)
Rate on ten-year Belgian government bonds
Source : ECB.
(1)  Actual figures up to April 2010, assumptions from May 2010.
(2)  Actual figures up to the first quarter of 2010, assumptions from the second quarter of 2010.14
chart  2  gdp and thE BusinEss survEy indicator




















































































































































GDP in volume (year-on-year changes) 
(left-hand scale)
Overall synthetic curve (1) (right-hand scale)
Smoothed series
Gross series
GDP AND BUSINESS SURVEY INDICATOR
Belgium
Euro area
GDP IN BELGIUM AND THE EURO AREA
(percentage changes in volume compared to 
the corresponding quarter of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Seasonally adjusted data.
quarter of 2009, though it has remained relatively weak 
since then. According to the NAI data, following an initial 
0.7 p.c. bounce in the third quarter, the quarterly growth 
rate subsided to 0.3 p.c. in the fourth quarter of 2009, 
and then – according to the flash estimate – to 0.1 p.c. 
in the first quarter of 2010. However, that last figure is 
2.  Activity and employment
In parallel with the improvement in the business survey 
indicators, activity in Belgium has mirrored the recovery 
recorded from the middle of last year in the euro area. 










Interest rate on three-month interbank deposits in euro   . . . . . . . 1.2 0.8 1.1
Yield on ten-year Belgian government bonds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 3.5 3.9
EUR/USD exchange rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.39 1.29 1.26
Oil price (US dollars per barrel)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.9 79.5 83.7
(percentage changes)
Export markets relevant to Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –10.8 7.0 4.2
Competitors’ export prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.9 4.3 2.2
Source : ECB.
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affected to some extent by the adverse weather condi-
tions for the construction sector.
Though  the  recession  was  exceptionally  severe  –  on  a 
scale not seen since the Second World War – its impact 
was  a  little  less  harsh  in  Belgium  than  elsewhere,  the 
decline in GDP averaging 3 p.c. in 2009, against an aver-
age of –4.1 p.c. in the euro area. Similarly, the recovery 
seen so far has been a little more robust, with annual GDP 
growth reaching 1 p.c. in the first quarter of 2010, against 
0.6 p.c. in the euro area. The absence of major structural 
imbalances in terms of external accounts, private sector 
debt and the property market – imbalances which do exist 
in some euro area countries – is a factor in this relative 
resilience of the Belgian economy.
In that context, activity should continue to gain strength 
in  2010  and  2011,  underpinned  in  particular  by  the 
improvement  in  the  international  environment  and  the 
expected  gradual  strengthening  of  domestic  demand. 
According to the Bank’s projections, annual GDP growth 
should average 1.3 p.c. in 2010 and 1.7 p.c. in 2011, 
slightly outpacing the growth forecast for the euro area. 
However,  that  will  still  be  well  below  the  growth  of 
2.5 p.c. per annum recorded from 2004 to 2007, before 
the economic and financial crisis.
In  view  of  the  severity  of  the  2009  recession,  it  now 
seems that job losses were relatively limited in that year. 
In fact, large-scale, extended recourse to systems permit-
ting some flexibility in the use of labour, mainly temporary 
lay-offs for manual workers but also additional measures 
under the recovery plan – notably the option of suspend-
ing execution of employment contracts for white-collar 
workers under certain conditions, or measures to encour-
age reductions in working time – cushioned the impact on 
employment, and probably indirectly supported demand, 
during the recession period.
By reducing the actual working time of persons in work, 
these  systems  enable  firms  to  adapt,  to  some  extent, 
the volume of labour used without having to make staff 
redundant. The implicit average working time per person 
therefore  declined  by  1.5  p.c.  in  2009.  However,  that 
adjustment is partial, as sudden fluctuations in activity are 
generally  accompanied  by  cyclical  movements  affecting 
productivity per hour worked. Thus, when GDP dropped 
by 3 p.c. in 2009, the volume of labour fell by 1.8 p.c. and 
hourly productivity declined by 1.1 p.c.
In 2010 and 2011, firms are expected to make substantial 
use of the expansion of activity to gradually restore their 
productivity, so that the volume of labour will increase by 
only 0.1 p.c. in 2010 and 0.6 p.c. in 2011. Moreover, as 
use of the system of temporary lay-offs diminishes, the 
average working time of employees is expected to return 
gradually to its pre-crisis level. Therefore, as an annual 
average, the fall in the number of persons in employment 
is likely to continue in 2010, with a 0.3 p.c. decline, com-
pared to 0.4 p.c. in 2009.
In relation to the fourth quarter of 2008, over 38,000 jobs 
were  lost  during  2009,  and  another  13,000  job  losses 
are forecast for 2010. The projections anticipate a slight 
improvement during 2011. The number of unemployed 
job-seekers  is  expected  to  increase  by  127,000  units 
between the end of 2008 and the end of 2011, owing 
to the rise in the number of persons joining the labour 












































































































































(percentage year-on-year changes, 
calendar adjusted data)
Sources : EC, NAI, NEO, NBB.
(1)  Harmonised unemployment rate (age 15 and over), as a percentage of the labour 
force.16
market. While unemployment averaged 7 p.c. in 2008 and 
8 p.c. in 2009, the rate is set to rise to 8.3 p.c. in 2010 and 
8.8 p.c. in 2011. However, the rise in the unemployment 
rate since the outbreak of the economic crisis has been 
considerably smaller in Belgium than in the euro area.
3.  Demand components
In 2010, export growth is again set to be the main factor 
supporting the revival in economic activity which began 
in  mid  2009.  Exports  should  in  fact  benefit  from  both 
strong expansion on the export markets where Belgian 
firms are active and from the depreciation of the euro. 
Conversely, the contribution of domestic demand to GDP 
growth is likely to remain very modest in 2010. During 
2011, domestic demand should nevertheless strengthen 
to become the main engine of GDP growth. In the wake 
of that strengthening demand, imports are expected to 
grow more rapidly, considerably reducing the contribution 
of net exports to GDP growth.
Just as the collapse of world trade in the second half of 
2008 was the main factor in the spread of the economic 
crisis, the ensuing recovery of world trade is the principal 
driver behind the upturn in economic activity since mid 
2009. That recovery is expected to continue in 2010 and 
2011, albeit at a less sustained pace. After contracting 
by 10.8 p.c. in real terms in 2009, the export markets 
of Belgian firms are set to expand by 7 p.c. in 2010 and 
4.2  p.c.  in  2011.  The  depreciation  of  the  euro  is  also 
stimulating exports. Overall, they should return to positive 
growth, reaching 6.4 p.c. in 2010 and 4.3 p.c. in 2011.
In the absence of support from domestic demand, how-
ever, imports are set to grow more slowly in 2010, so 
that net exports should make a positive contribution of 
1 percentage point to GDP growth this year. If domestic 
demand also begins rising again in 2011, import growth 
is likely to decelerate by less than exports, so that the 
contribution of net exports will be considerably smaller 
that year, at 0.4 percentage point.
Table  3	 Labour	suppLy	and	demand













GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 0.8 –3.0 1.3 1.7
Volume of labour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 1.3 –1.8 0.1 0.6
Domestic employment in persons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 –0.4 –0.3 0.0
(changes in thousands of persons)
Domestic employment   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.3 82.1 –16.4 –14.6 –1.3
p.m.	Change	during	the	year	 (1)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   80.9   64.2   –38.5   –12.9   8.2
Employees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.9 72.0 –20.4 –14.9 –2.3
of which : branches sensitive to the business cycle   . . . . . . . 49.0 48.7 –44.7 –35.2 –23.1
Self-employed persons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 10.1 4.0 0.3 1.0
Frontier workers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total employment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.1 82.5 –16.4 –14.6 –1.3
Unemployed job-seekers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –53.1 –25.7 50.4 39.6 37.6
p.m.	Change	during	the	year	 (1)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   –49.8   –4.9   59.6   42.7   24.5
Labour force  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.0 56.7 34.1 25.0 36.3
p.m.	Harmonised	activity	rate	 (2)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   67.1   67.1   66.9   67.0   67.1
Harmonised	employment	rate	 (2)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   62.0   62.4   61.6   61.1   60.8
Harmonised	unemployment	rate	 (3)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7.5   7.0   8.0   8.3   8.8
Sources : EC, NAI, NEO, NBB.
(1)  Difference between the fourth quarter of the year concerned and the fourth quarter of the previous year.
(2)  Percentages of the population of working age (15-64 years), non calendar adjusted data.
(3)  Percentages of the labour force (15-64 years), non calendar adjusted data.
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Domestic  demand  is  also  projected  to  remain  relatively 
weak  in  2010,  but  all  its  components  are  expected  to 
return to positive growth in 2011. Business investment 
is likely to continue falling in 2010 – by 1.5 p.c. in real 
terms – after a very steep 6.4 p.c. decline in 2009. In the 
euro area as a whole, business investment recorded an 
even larger fall (14.1 p.c.). Following the significant deteri-
oration in global economic activity, the capacity utilisation 
rate of firms contracted sharply. According to the quar-
terly survey of manufacturing industry, that rate declined 
from the figure of 82.4 p.c. recorded in the third quarter 
of 2008 to a historic low of 70.1 p.c. in the first quarter 
of 2009. Although a recovery followed – the utilisation 
rate reaching 77.2 p.c. in the first quarter of 2010 – that 
residual excess capacity is likely to continue to dampen 
firms’ propensity to invest for some time to come. True, 
final demand is predicted to begin rising in 2010, but the 
growth rate is likely to fall short of its pre-crisis level, pre-
venting the rapid absorption of excess capacity. Business 
investment is not expected to expand until 2011, and then 
only by 1.2 p.c. In regard to investment financing, two 
opposing  movements  should  partly  offset  one  another. 
On the one hand, the gradual rise in long-term interest 
rates could curb business investment slightly. Moreover, 
until the financial sector has finished reorganising its own 
activities, a question mark remains over its willingness to 
satisfy growing demand for credit at an acceptable price. 
On the other hand, after falling by 10.7 p.c. in 2009, the 
gross operating surplus of enterprises is projected to rise 
again in 2010 and 2011, by 7.9 and 3.8 p.c. respectively ; 
that would enable firms to revert to making more use of 
internal financing. That increase in the gross operating 
surplus originates partly from expansion in the volume of 
sales – of around 2.5 p.c. per annum – and partly from an 
increase in the gross operating margin per unit of sales. 
Against the backdrop of strengthening demand, selling 
prices are in fact likely to rise faster than unit costs in 
2010, the latter being held down by particularly moderate 
movements in labour costs. Expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, this increase in the gross operating surplus of firms 
will, however, be insufficient to negate the whole of the 
decline recorded in 2008 and 2009.
In real terms, the decline in investment in housing which 
had  begun  in  2007  is  set  to  continue  in  2010  and  in 
2011, albeit at a slower rate. While a fall of 2.9 p.c. had 
been recorded in 2009, households are projected to cut 
their investment in the construction of new housing or 
the renovation of existing housing by 1.3 and 0.1 p.c. 
respectively.  These  findings  are  attributable  mainly  to 
the  expected  adverse  movement  in  the  real  disposable 
incomes of households. Since the unemployment rate is 
still rising, the increase in real wages remains modest, and 
inflation is weakening consumer confidence and dispos-
able incomes, individuals are reluctant to spend on major 
items  such  as  house  building  or  renovation.  Moreover, 
mortgage interest rates could gradually increase, as the 
banks may pass on to their customers the expected rise in 
long-term interest rates, and the balance sheet problems 
which banks are facing could cause them to cut back their 
Table  4	 GDP	anD	main	exPenDiture	cateGories












Private consumption expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.0 –1.7 0.6 1.2
Consumption expenditure of general government  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.3 1.6 1.4 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 3.8 –4.2 –1.4 1.5
Housing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.8 –1.6 –2.9 –1.3 –0.1
General government  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.4 11.7 –0.7 8.8
Enterprises   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 6.1 –6.4 –1.5 1.2
p.m.	Total	final	domestic	expenditure	 (1)	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2.7   2.2   –1.5   0.4   1.3
Change in stocks  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.2 –1.5 –0.1 0.1
Net exports of goods and services  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 –1.0 0.0 1.0 0.4
Exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 1.4 –12.6 6.4 4.3
Imports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.7 –12.8 5.2 4.1
GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 0.8 –3.0 1.3 1.7
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Contribution to the change in GDP.
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lending. Finally, the moderate price rises on the secondary 
market could be a factor contributing to the weakness of 
households’ propensity to invest.
In  2009,  private  consumption  recorded  an  unusually 
sharp fall of 1.7 p.c. in real terms. That decline must be 
seen in the context of the exceptionally great uncertainty 
prevailing  at  the  height  of  the  economic  and  financial 
crisis.  Adverse  prospects  for  the  labour  market,  and 
hence for future remuneration, severe losses on financial 
assets and the deterioration in public finances undeniably 
prompted  individuals  to  delay  certain  major  purchases. 
In  2010,  private  consumption  will  cease  falling,  but 
growth is projected at only 0.6 p.c. That is due mainly to 
the contraction of disposable income. In 2009, the real 
disposable income of households increased strongly as a 
result of several government measures aimed at reducing 
the net personal income tax bill, and because individuals 
benefited from the fact that the indexation of wages and 
social benefits was significantly greater than the erosion 
of purchasing power owing to the fall in inflation. Since 
the government did not repeat those measures and since 
the indexation of wages and social benefits is likely to be 
considerably below the rise in inflation, real disposable 
incomes  are  set  to  fall  by  1.1  p.c.  in  2010.  Moreover, 
(real) wage moderation contributes to the reduction in the 
growth of disposable incomes, although it does help to 
maintain employment. In 2010, though the savings ratio 
is likely to be lower than in 2009, it is still projected reach 
nearly 20 p.c. of household disposable incomes, which is 
well above its pre-crisis level. The outlook for household 
incomes in fact remains uncertain, in view of the dete-
riorating  situation  on  the  labour  market  and  in  public 
finances following the recession. In 2011, consumption 
is forecast to increase again, bolstered by the growth of 
disposable incomes and an easing of the labour market 
situation. Although wage growth is expected to remain 
modest in real terms in 2011, real disposable incomes are 
projected to increase again, by 1.2 p.c.
In  contrast  to  the  rise  in  private  sector  spending,  the 
growth of general government consumption expenditure 
is expected to slacken pace slightly, falling from 1.6 p.c. 
in 2009 to 1.4 p.c. in 2010 and 1.3 p.c. in 2011. General 
government  investment  which  had  expanded  strongly 
by 11.7 p.c. in 2009, is set to subside a little in 2010. 
Fluctuating  according  to  the  election  timetable,  it  is 
expected to record a further sharp rise of 8.8 p.c. in 2011, 
in the run-up to the 2012 municipal elections.
chart  4  main ExpEnditurE catEgoriEs
(non calendar adjusted volume data, percentage changes 
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Sources : ECB, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Seasonally adjusted data.
(2)  Calendar adjusted data.
(3)  Excluding change in stocks.
(4)  Value data.
(5)  Data deflated by the private consumption expenditure deflator.19
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In contrast, inflation excluding energy is expected to slow 
significantly, dropping from an annual average of 1.9 p.c. 
in 2009 to 0.9 p.c. in 2010. This fall, which had begun 
during 2009, is attributable to both non-energy industrial 
goods and to services. However, inflation is expected to 
edge upwards at the end of the year and in 2011, owing 
to the gradual improvement in economic activity, but also 
to the effects of the euro depreciation.
In particular, after a 6.6 p.c. fall in 2009, the projected rise 
in the import deflator of 2.8 p.c. in 2010 and 2.4 p.c. in 
the following year would lead to a steady increase in the 
prices of non-energy industrial goods. The movement in 
the price of services is largely affected by the pattern of 
unit labour costs in the private sector. After increasing by 
4.6 p.c. in 2009, those prices are set to remain virtually 
stable in 2010, before a modest 0.8 p.c. increase in 2011.
The  rapid  rise  in  unit  labour  costs  in  2009  and  their 
marked slowdown in 2010 are due predominantly to the 
cyclical profile of labour productivity. While firms did not 
cut the volume of labour entirely in line with the drop in 
output in 2009 – giving rise to a marked 1.1 p.c. decline 
in hourly productivity – they are likely to take advantage 
of the revival in activity to improve efficiency in their use 
of the factor labour. Thus, hourly labour productivity is 
expected  to  increase  by  around  1  p.c.  in  2010  and  in 
chart  5  inflation
(HICP, percentage changes compared to the corresponding period of the previous year)
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4.  Prices and costs
After  falling  to  a  maximum  negative  level  of  –1.7  p.c. 
in  July  2009,  owing  to  the  steep  decline  in  oil  prices, 
consumer  price  inflation  returned  to  positive  figures 
from December and continued to rise during the ensuing 
months. That rise was initially due to the disappearance of 
the base effects connected with the oil price movements ; 
it was reinforced in recent months by a further rise in 
commodity  prices  on  the  international  markets,  com-
bined with a depreciation of the euro against the dollar. 
In  April 2010,  inflation  measured  by  the  HICP reached   
2 p.c.
According to the assumptions adopted for this exercise, 
prices will maintain their upward trend in 2010 and 2011, 
although they will rise less steeply than at the beginning 
of this year. As an annual average, they are expected to 
increase from 61.9 dollars per barrel of Brent in 2009, or 
44.1 euro per barrel, to 79.5 dollars in 2010 and 83.7 dol-
lars in 2011 (61.5 and 66.7 euro respectively in 2010 and 
2011), one reason being the revival in demand from the 
emerging countries. This rise accounts for much of the 
acceleration in overall inflation, forecast to rise from 0 p.c. 
in 2009 to 2 p.c. in 2010 and 1.9 p.c. in 2011. The health 
index  is  projected  to  increase  by  1.3  p.c.  in  2010  and 
1.7 p.c. in 2011, following a 0.6 p.c. rise in 2009.20
2011, though that is slightly below the average rise of 
1.2 p.c. recorded from 2004 to 2008.
Hourly labour costs in the private sector are also likely to 
contribute to the strong deceleration in unit labour costs 
between  2009  and  2010,  their  increase  slowing  from 
3.4 p.c. to 0.9 p.c. That corresponds essentially to the 
expected impact of indexation, which has taken time to 
reflect the higher inflation measured by the health index 
in 2008, followed by the marked fall in the next year. 
Leaving aside indexation, the rise in labour costs in real 
terms  will  be  limited  since  the  central  agreement  only 
provides for the possibility of granting one-off bonuses 
of 125 euro in 2009 and 250 euro in 2010. Moreover, 
two effects – both connected with the sharp deteriora-
tion in the economic climate – have worked in opposing 
directions in 2009 and 2010. Variable remuneration was 
reduced owing to the decline in corporate results, while 
the rising job losses led to an increase in redundancy pay-
ments made by employers.
The assumption adopted for 2011 of a 1.7 p.c. increase 
in hourly labour costs in the private sector corresponds 
essentially to the expected effect of indexation. This is a 
technical assumption which does not in any way prejudge 
the outcome of the forthcoming wage negotiations for 
the period 2011-2012.
5.  Public finances
5.1  Overall balance
The  economic  and  financial  crisis  caused  a  surge  in 
budget  deficits  in  almost  all  the  advanced  economies. 
The  same  applied  to  Belgium  since,  according  to  the 
provisional  data  published  by  the  NAI  in  March  2010, 
Belgium’s public deficit came to 6 p.c. of GDP in 2009. In 
the macroeconomic context described above, the general 
government accounts are likely to record further deficits 
in 2010 and in 2011, of 5 and 5.3 p.c. of GDP respectively.
The  improvement  in  the  financing  balance  in  2010  is 
due  largely  to  the  disappearance  of  the  non-recurrent 
factors which had adversely affected public finances in 
2009. In that year, the federal government had speeded 
up  the  personal  income  tax  assessments,  significantly 
augmenting the amount of payments in favour of house-
holds.  Moreover,  primary  expenditure  had  also  been 
inflated in 2009 following two court rulings ordering the 
Belgian government to repay substantial amounts of taxes 
wrongly levied in the past from certain companies receiv-
ing  dividends  from  subsidiaries,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
from married unemployed persons, on the other.
Interest  charges  are  projected  to  remain  unchanged 
overall throughout the projection period, as a result of 
the low level of interest rates. Although the public debt 
Table  5	 Price	and	cost	indicators












HICP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.0 1.9
Health index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.2 0.6 1.3 1.7
Underlying inflation  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.7 2.0 0.8 1.0
GDP deflator   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 0.9 1.6 1.5
Labour costs in the private sector :
Labour costs per hour worked   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.9 1.7
Employers’ social security contributions  (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 –0.3 0.6 0.6 0.1
Gross wages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.7 2.8 0.3 1.6
of which indexation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 2.9 2.5 0.5 1.8
Labour productivity  (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 –0.1 –1.1 1.0 0.9
Unit labour costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.4 4.6 –0.1 0.8
Sources : EC ; FPS Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue ; NAI ; NBB.
(1)  Measured by the HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy.
(2)  Contribution to the change in labour costs following adjustments to the implicit contribution rates, percentage points.
(3)  Value added in volume per hour worked by employees and self-employed persons.
 21
economic projections for Belgium – spring 2010
would  increase,  the  impact  of  that  growth  on  interest 
charges would be almost totally neutralised by the fall in 
the implicit interest rate on the public debt.
It should be noted that these projections take account 
only  of  budgetary  measures  which  have  already  been 
announced and specified in sufficient detail. They disre-
gard the effect of any measures yet to be taken, particu-
larly when the 2011 budgets are drawn up. The January 
2010 stability programme provides for a deficit of 4.8 p.c. 
of GDP in 2010, which is to be cut to 4.1 p.c. of GDP in 
2011 and 3 p.c. of GDP in 2012, and a return to a bal-
anced budget in 2015.
5.2  Revenue
After contracting in 2009, public revenues expressed as a 
percentage of GDP are projected to rise by 0.6 percentage 
point in 2010 and 0.2 percentage point in 2011.
However,  the  expected  decline  in  the  share  of  labour 
incomes – which are subject to relatively high fiscal pres-
sure – will have a negative impact on the movement in 
fiscal and parafiscal revenues as a ratio of GDP during the 
projection period. Conversely, the revenue ratio is being 
inflated in 2010 by the effect of the disappearance of the 
negative impact on revenues in 2009 resulting from the 
acceleration of the personal income tax assessments. The 
rise in the revenue ratio predicted for 2010 is also due to 
structural measures. For instance, the levies on labour will 
increase  as  a  result  of  the  smaller  lump-sum  reduction 
granted by the Flemish Region to its residents, but that 
effect will be partly offset by the impact of the granting 
of tax-favourable wage increases totalling a maximum of 
250 euro per person, under the central agreement, and 
the impact of the 2005 reform of the system of deducting 
mortgage  charges  on  owner-occupied  homes.  In  addi-
tion, taxes on companies will be increased by the imposi-
tion of tighter conditions for claiming the allowance for 
finally taxed income, by adapting tax deduction rates for 













Revenues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 48.8 48.3 48.8 49.0
Fiscal and parafiscal revenue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.3 43.7 43.0 43.3 43.2
Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.8
Primary expenditure   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.5 46.2 50.6 50.2 50.7
Primary balance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.6 –2.3 –1.4 –1.7
Interest charges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7
Financing requirement (–) or capacity   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 –1.2 –6.0 –5.0 –5.3
p.m.	Effect	of	non-recurrent	factors	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   –0.1   0.0   –0.9   0.0   0.0
Sources : NAI, NBB.




(millions of euro, unless otherwise stated ;  






Taxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627 –27
of which :
Tax reduction granted  
by the Flemish Region  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . 432 –150
Deduction of mortgage charges  
for own homes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –208 0
Tax-favourable wage increases  . . . . . –113 0
Corporation tax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403 0
Excise duty on petrol and diesel  . . . 229 120
Reduction in VAT in hotel and 
catering trade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –255 0
Social security contributions  . . . . . . . . . . . –70 0
  total	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   557   –27
p.m.	Percentages	of	GDP	 . . . . . . . . . . . . .   	 0.2   	 0.0
Sources : Budget documents, FPS Finance, NSSO.
(1)  Part of the tax reduction granted by the Flemish Region to self-employed 
persons on income in 2009 will not be taken into account until the time of the 
tax assessment, namely in 2011.
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company car expenses and fuel costs and by the limit on 
the rate used to calculate risk capital allowance. In regard 
to the taxes on goods and services, the revenues gener-
ated by the increase in excise duty on diesel will be offset 
by  the  cut  in  VAT  on  meals  in  hotels  and  restaurants, 
down from 21 to 12 p.c. The measures already approved 
will have little impact on fiscal and parafiscal revenues in 
2011.
During the projection period, the other revenues will be 
driven up by higher payments made by financial institu-
tions supported by the government during the financial 
crisis, and by the new levy relating to the deposit protec-
tion system.
5.3  Primary expenditure
Primary expenditure increased sharply in 2009, expressed 
as a percentage of a GDP which had suddenly slumped. 
That  expenditure  ratio  should  fall  slightly  in  2010,  but 
is likely to rise again in 2011. In volume terms, primary 
expenditure  is  expected  to  remain  virtually  stable  in 
2010 and should expand by 2.2 p.c. in 2011. This year, 
the movement in that expenditure will benefit from the 
absence of indexation of wages and social benefits and 
from  court  decisions  which  drove  up  expenditure  sub-
stantially in 2009. Conversely, it will feel the impact of the 
increase  in  unemployment  expenditure  associated  with 
the deterioration in economic activity. Adjusted for these 
non-recurring or cyclical factors and the effects of indexa-
tion, primary expenditure is projected to grow by 2.3 and 
2 p.c. respectively in 2010 and 2011, or still well ahead 
of trend GDP.
The  2010  increase  in  expenditure  –  adjusted  for  those 
various factors – is the outcome of divergent movements 
within  the  general  government  sub-sectors.  At  federal 
government level, the increase will be smaller than in the 
three preceding years, while remaining substantial. One 
of the factors driving that growth, notably the expansion 
of certain employment promotion measures such as the 
general  reduction  in  payroll  tax,  recorded  as  a  subsidy 
in  accordance  with  the  ESA  95,  will  increase  primary 
expenditure to an even greater extent than in 2009. At 
the same time, the increase in social security expenditure 
is set to slow down gradually, reverting to a rate below 
the average for the past ten years. The main categories 
of social expenditure are projected to rise by less than 
in  2009,  but  some  of  them,  such  as  health  care  and 
unemployment benefits, will continue to grow strongly. 
Some of them will still be influenced by a set of measures 
concerning adjustment in line with prosperity. In the case 
of the Communities and Regions and the local authorities, 
expenditure will grow at a fairly modest pace.
In 2011, the adjusted real growth of federal government 
expenditure  is  expected  to  be  relatively  muted,  owing 
in  particular  to  the  virtual  stabilisation  of  the  amounts 
relating to the measures to reduce the payroll tax. The 
projections  for  social  security  expenditure  take  account 
of a set of measures to increase social benefits ; these will 
augment expenditure, although to a lesser degree than 
in 2010. In contrast to these first two sub-sectors, the 
Communities and Regions do not yet have a budget for 
2011, so that the projections are based largely on past 
developments.  Local  authority  expenditure  is  likely  to 
expand relatively strongly as a result of substantial invest-
ments in the year preceding the local elections.
5.4  Debt
Between 1993 – when the public debt had peaked at 
134.1 p.c. of GDP – and 2007, the general government 
debt ratio had declined continuously at an annual aver-
age rate of 3.6 percentage points, mainly as a result of 
chart  6  primary ExpEnditurE of gEnEral 
govErnmEnt and gdp











































































Primary expenditure of general government 
(deflated by the HICP and adjusted for cyclical, 
non-recurring or fiscally neutral factors and 
the effects of indexation (1))
GDP in volume 
(data adjusted for seasonal and calendar effects)
Sources : NAI, FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  Effect due to the gap between actual indexation of public sector pay and social 
benefits, on the one hand, and the rise in the HICP on the other.23
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endogenous  factors  such  as  the  primary  surplus,  the 
reduction in the implicit interest rate, and the economic 
growth rate. At the end of 2007, the debt ratio stood at 
84.2 p.c. of GDP.
In 2008, the capital injections and loans granted to finan-
cial  institutions  during  the  crisis  in  the  financial  sector 
caused a surge in the general government debt. By the 
end of that year, it had already reached 89.8 p.c. of GDP. 
It continued to rise in the following year, and by the end 
of  2009  the  Belgian  public  debt  came  to  96.8  p.c.  of 
GDP. That 7 percentage point increase was due solely to 
endogenous factors, under the combined effect of the 
decline in nominal GDP and the substantial deterioration 
in the primary surplus.
In 2010 and 2011, the endogenous increase in the debt 
is likely to continue, but at a slower rate than in 2009, 
as economic activity regains momentum and the primary 
balance improves somewhat. In 2010, with due regard for 
the loans granted by the   federal government to Greece 
in the context of the debt crisis afflicting that country, 
the debt ratio is expected to rise to a little over 100 p.c. 
of  GDP.  In  2011,  it  is  projected  to  increase  further,  to 
103.1 p.c. of GDP.
6.  Risk factor assessment
Like the euro area, and the global economy in general, 
Belgium came out of the recession phase in mid 2009. 
Since then, the recovery has been slightly stronger than 
expected,  owing  to  the  dynamism  of  the  emerging 









































































































































ENDOGENOUS CHANGE (2) 
(1)  Consolidated gross debt of general government.
(2)  The endogenous change in the public debt reflects the debt dynamics, leaving 
aside the impact of operations which influence the debt without affecting the 
overall balance.
Table  8	 Comparison	of	the	foreCasts	for	Belgium






















NBB – Spring 2010  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.9 –5.0 –5.3 June 2010
p.m.	Autumn	2009	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1.0   –   1.6   –   –5.4   –   December	2009
Federal Planning Bureau (FPB)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.7 –4.7 –5.1 May 2010
IMF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 –5.1 –4.4 April 2010
EC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 –5.0 –5.0 May 2010
OECD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 –4.9 –4.2 May 2010
p.m.	Actual	figures	2009	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   –3.0   0.0   –6.0
(1)  HICP, except FPB : final private consumption deflator.
(2)  Percentages of GDP.
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countries and the impact of fiscal and monetary support 
measures ; that explains the small upward revision in GDP 
growth predicted for 2010, from 1 p.c. in the December 
2009 forecasting exercise to 1.3 p.c. in the new exercise. 
Thus, the Bank’s growth projections are close to those of 
other forecasters for both 2010 and 2011. The Bank puts 
inflation at a higher figure, on account of the recent rise 
in oil prices and the depreciation of the euro. In regard 
to the general government budget balance, the deficit of 
5.3 p.c. of GDP in 2011 predicted by the Bank is higher 
than the forecasts of the IMF or the OECD, as those two 
institutions implicitly take account of additional consoli-
dation measures beyond those which governments have 
already implemented.
While  all  forecasters  expect  the  recovery  to  continue, 
the  advanced  economies  will  nevertheless  still  feel  the 
impact of the economic and financial crisis. The baseline 
scenario assumed for a number of months now suggests 
that  a  slow  recovery  of  domestic  demand,  and  hence 
activity, remains the most likely outcome, owing to the 
adjustments which the various sectors will need to make. 
Excess  production  capacity  still  persists,  in  both  capital 
and labour, so that investment and employment will take 
a while yet to recover. In addition, financial institutions 
need to continue reorganising their activities and balance 
sheets, and that could curb lending.
This  scenario  of  a  slow  recovery  applies  to  most  of 
the European economies, and is therefore not specific 
to  Belgium.  Conversely,  in  the  absence  of  significant 
imbalances at the level of foreign trade, domestic sector 
debt  or  the  property  market,  the  scale  of  the  reces-
sion in 2008-2009 was slightly smaller in Belgium than 
in  the  euro  area,  and  Belgian  growth  will  be  slightly 
higher  in  2010  and  2011.  Although  the  balance  of 
current transactions for the Belgian economy remains 
below the figure for the early 2000s, it is still decidedly 
positive ; according to the forecasts, it will amount to 
1.8 and 1.7 p.c. of GDP in 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
Over time, this positive balance has led to the forma-
tion of net financial assets in relation to the rest of the 
world. Owing to more prudent practices than in other 
countries,  particularly  in  regard  to  mortgage  loans, 
the household debt ratio is also lower than the euro 
area average, while the financial structure of firms has 
strengthened. However, taking account of its economic 
and  financial  openness,  Belgium  is  unlikely  to  escape 
any risks which materialise in other countries.
In that regard, the serious tensions on the government 
bond markets since April 2010 reflect the difficulties sur-
rounding the exit from the crisis for public finances. While 
the rising deficits and public debt in most countries are 
an  inevitable  consequence  of  government  intervention 
to  support  the  financial  sector  and  the  economy,  they 
threaten the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
In  that  context,  though  the  retrenchment  measures 
announced in a growing number of countries could cer-
tainly hamper the recovery for a time, while it remains 
fragile, the absence of any clear prospect of consolidation 
would trigger a rise in interest rates, as illustrated recently 
by the case of Greece, and could prompt households to 
raise  their  savings  ratio  as  a  precaution  in  the  face  of 
uncertainty over their future income.
Very considerable uncertainty therefore persists over the 
economic outlook for the euro area and for Belgium, and 
the risks – if they materialise – would tend to dampen 
the  growth  of  activity  and  demand.  That  would  have 
the effect of curbing inflation, but conversely, the gen-
eralisation of the upward effect generated by the energy 
component or the euro depreciation could push inflation 
above the level assumed in the projections. It is therefore 
necessary to maintain the ability of the Belgian economy 
to take advantage of the recovery and to cope with the 
accompanying  fits  and  starts  by  establishing  a  stable 
macroeconomic framework. Such a framework needs to 
be based, in particular, on a sustainable long-term path 
for public finances and moderate movements in wages, 
in line with developments in the main trading partners.   
At  the  same  time,  it  is  vital  to  strengthen  the  growth 
potential  of  productivity  and  employment,  not  only 
to  boost  the  economy’s  resistance  to  cyclical  shocks, 
but also in preparation for the challenges ahead in the   
longer term.25
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Annex
Projections for the Belgian economy : summary of the main results












  growth (calendar adjusted data)
GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 0.8 –3.0 1.3 1.7
Contributions to growth :
Domestic expenditure, excluding change in stocks   . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.1 –1.5 0.4 1.2
Net exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 –1.0 0.0 1.0 0.4
Change in stocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.2 –1.5 –0.1 0.1
  Prices and costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.0 1.9
Health index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.2 0.6 1.3 1.7
GDP deflator   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 0.9 1.6 1.5
Terms of trade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –2.2 2.6 0.3 –0.5
Unit labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.4 4.6 –0.1 0.8
Hourly labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.9 1.7
Hourly productivity in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 –0.1 –1.1 1.0 0.9
  labour market
Domestic employment  
(annual average change in thousands of units)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.3 82.1 –16.4 –14.6 –1.3
p.m.	Change	during	the	year,	in	thousands	of	persons	 (1)	 . . . . . .     80.9     64.2     –38.5     –12.9     8.2
Total volume of labour  (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 1.3 –1.8 0.1 0.6
Harmonised unemployment rate  (3) (p.c. of the labour force)  . . . 7.5 7.0 8.0 8.3 8.8
  incomes
Real disposable income of individuals   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.3 3.8 –1.1 1.2
Savings ratio of individuals (p.c. of disposable income)  . . . . . . . . 16.2 16.6 21.0 19.7 20.0
  Public finances  (4)
Overall balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 –1.2 –6.0 –5.0 –5.3
Primary balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.6 –2.3 –1.4 –1.7
Public debt (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.2 89.8 96.8 100.2 103.1
  current account 
  (p.c. of GDP according to the balance of payments)  . . . . . . . . . .   1.6   –2.9   0.5   1.8   1.7
Sources : EC, DGSEI, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Difference between the fourth quarter of the year concerned and the fourth quarter of the previous year.
(2)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(3)  Non calendar adjusted data.
(4)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 